What kind of tripartite relations have Korea and Taiwan built since democratization? As for the tripartite relations in both countries before democratization, they are often referred to with the concept of "state corporatism". But nowadays, after 20 years of democracy, and 10 years since the Asian economic crisis, is corporatism still effective as a framework to analyze tripartite relations and the process of policy-making? In this paper I will show that it is effective, and I would also like to observe the different ways in which corporatism has appeared in both countries in recent years. In this paper, I will first explore the classical argument of Schmitter and its recent revival as the "competitive corporatism" (Section 1). Then, once the preconditions of the new corporatism in Korea and Taiwan have been presented (Section 2), I will analyze two corporatist agreements in each countries (Taiwan = Section 3, Korea = Section 4). Taking into account the abovementioned points, I will examine by comparison the nature and effects of the new corporatism in both countries (Section 5). The new corporatism in Korea and Taiwan shows a contrast that can be summarized as "big deal" (Korea) and "small deal" (Taiwan). However, even in the case of Korean tripartite negotiation, which succeeded in the "big deal", it is uncertain whether it is functioning really "competitively". Needless to say, it depends on one's point of view that how one evaluates this situation.
Full paper download: Kamimura Y_new corporatism.pdf