Introduction

The first thesis in this paper is that there is a strong but complex relationship between social inclusion (mostly as an outcome but also as a process), social exclusion (mostly as a process but also as an outcome) and the social cohesiveness of societies. This has direct parallels with citizenship theories which will be discussed in passing.

The second thesis is that migration has a major impact on inclusion, exclusion and cohesion both in the migrants’ country of settlement and their country of origin.

The third is that national and personal identity have become extremely complex because of the massive increase in migration in present times (which can be characterised as late modern, postmodern or postindustrial according to preference) under the influence of factors associated with globalisation.

Bringing together insights about identity, migration, inclusion, exclusion and social cohesion provides an opportunity to reconsider issues of welfare both within and between societies. The final section of the paper takes some tentative steps in this direction by introducing the synoptic social quality construct, with particular reference to the social quality of migrant and other ethnos communities with their transnational identities. Here the specific focus is upon the work of the East Asian Social Quality Indicators Network, which, fittingly, is hosted by NTU and led by Professor Lih-Rong (Lillian) Wang. This network is in the process of collecting internationally comparative data on these issues which will facilitate future understanding of the nature of what can loosely be called ‘postmodern welfare’.

Social cohesion

Social cohesion is a long-established and venerable sociological construct, and is more or less directly descended from Tönnies’ (1957) notions of Gemeinschaft where cohesion is maintained by the family and peer group and Gesellschaft where formal authority provides structures for keeping society together. Durkheim developed this further in terms of mechanistic and organic solidarity. In mechanistic solidarity, mostly in pre-industrial societies, common

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1 The material here is developed from Phillips, 2006, chapter 5.
values, beliefs and experiences enable people to co-operate successfully. For organic solidarity on the other hand, mostly in industrialised societies, cohesion depends on shared moral experiences and expectations embodied in the law and market and maintained through the interdependence necessitated by high levels of functional differentiation: economic and social roles are so fragmented that people cannot survive in isolation. Another central strand comes from the work of Talcott Parsons in the 1950s on ‘normative integration’ (Gough, 1999). Here, the highly complex, differentiated modern social system is kept together by people’s internalisation of, and attachment to, abstract common normative values. So, in the transition from a traditional rural society to a modern industrial society, face-to-face solidarity was replaced by more abstract and impersonal expectations and norms of behaviour.

Vertovec (1999) gives a less abstract summary of different contemporary versions of social cohesion from different ideological perspectives as follows. For Marxists, social cohesion is a collective consciousness, produced by the division of labour in society, in other words, it is class consciousness. From T. H. Marshall’s (1950) social citizenship perspective (which has affinities with social democracy and Fabianism), social cohesion was created by the provision of a baseline of political, legal and social equality which also was used to legitimise economic inequality. From a liberal perspective, social cohesion flows from the rights and mutual respect of people interacting in pursuit of their own individual ends in interaction with each other. From the more right wing neo-liberal perspective, social cohesion is provided by buyers and sellers coming together in the market. Finally, for communitarians, social cohesion is provided by the neighbourhood community (perhaps with the wheel coming back full circle to Tönnies’ Gemeinschaft and Durkheim’s mechanistic solidarity). It can be seen that some of these conceptualisations of social cohesion go beyond the descriptive and analytical and are ideological in nature. There are strong ideological strands in many approaches to social cohesion, some of which are highly nationalistic and even xenophobic in nature, and others which have radical egalitarian goals.

Strong claims have been made for the benefits of the most radical conceptualisation of social cohesion. In a multicultural context, it is claimed that high levels of egalitarian social cohesion minimise inter-communal tensions and maximise national identity (Jenson, 1998). Wilkinson (1996: 1) maintains that countries with high levels of egalitarian social cohesion have lower mortality rates than countries with similar economic resources but lower levels of social cohesion.

In political terms it will come as no surprise that the most radical conceptualisation of social cohesion, with its emphasis on equality, welfare and social justice, is associated with a left-wing, egalitarian political perspective (Jenson, 1998; Bernard, 1999; Beck, et al., 2001). However, a narrower conceptual perspective of social cohesion has also been espoused by more conservative commentators as a component, along with civil society, of a well-functioning free-market society (Pahl, 1991; Broadbent, 2001).
Jenson (1998) even suggests that social cohesion ‘is sometimes deployed in right-wing and populist politics by those who long for the ‘good old days’.

Definitions

There are no highly specific definitions for social cohesion: they are all very abstract. Many commentators are pessimistic about arriving at a tight definition. Lockwood (1999: 82) expressed his surprise at this lack of clarity, given that over a hundred years have passed since Durkheim’s original work on this area and his proposition that the study of social solidarity was the central task of sociology. Jenson (1998: 4) agrees: ‘Despite lively conversations about social cohesion in policy circles, there is surprisingly little effort to say what it is. Any survey of the literature immediately reveals that there is no consensus about whether the definition of social cohesion or its links to a whole family of concepts often used when discussing it’. Vertovec (1999:xi) does not offer a definition but suggests rather that a variety of concepts, issues, perspectives and understandings be explored in order to arrive at a general sense of the term. He does however give as a starting point for a definition: ‘the presence of basic patterns of co-operative social interaction and core sets of collective values’. Berger (1998) takes a wide and holistic view of social cohesion as comprising norms, values and institutions, all mediated by the institutions of civil society.

Phillips and Berman (2003: 346) after reviewing much of the relevant literature, come to a composite definition which stresses norms of generosity as well as solidarity: ‘Social cohesion concerns the processes and infrastructures that create and underpin social networks, including social norms of solidarity and generosity among community members’. It is related to both social capital (World Bank, 1998) and social integration (Klitgaard & Fedderke, 1995). Berger-Schmitt usefully links social cohesion with both individual quality of life and Veenhoven's (1996) notion of quality of nations:

Social cohesion can be conceived as a societal quality which is experienced by individuals in their daily lives. … This perspective considers elements of the social cohesion of a society to form an integral part of the quality of life of the individuals belonging to that society. (Berger-Schmitt, 2000: 7)

Phillips (2006), in an extensive review of definition and operationalisation of social cohesion and social capital, found trust to be a ubiquitous theme. For example, the Canadian government’s definition of social cohesion includes: ‘ongoing process of developing a community of shared values, shared challenges and equal opportunities … based on a sense of trust, hope and reciprocity’ (Jenson, 1998: 4). Berger-Schmitt and Noll (2000) and Berger-Schmitt (2000) see social cohesion as including: trust in, and quality of, institutions.

For Fukuyama (1995) trust is the most important component of social capital: ‘the expectation that arises within a community of regular, honest and
cooperative behaviour, based on commonly shared norms’ (Fukuyama, 1995: 25). Here trust is seen as ‘a lubricant that makes the running of any group more efficient’ (Fukuyama, 1999: 16). For Fukuyama, a central theme is the ‘radius of trust’: the further it expands beyond the family, the more likely it is to be based on ‘moral resources’ and ethical behaviours. Trust can be decomposed into two sub-sets: generalised trust; and specific trust.

**General trust** follows a similar logic to Fukuyama’s notion of trust as a generic moral resource, the strength of which can be measured by applying Fukuyama’s notion of ‘the radius of trust’. A similar approach, labelled ‘generalised trust’ is used in Hall’s (1999) powerful analysis of social capital in Britain (and as updated by Grenier & Wright, 2003). **Specific trust** can be subdivided into two: institutional trust and personal trust. Institutional trust relates to trust by individuals, families and communities in the civic and societal institutions within the public domain, formal institutions and community frameworks. Personal trust relates to trust by individuals in significant others in their lives.

Phillips (2006) also identifies other integrative norms and values as being central to social cohesion, of which altruism is by far the most important. Indeed it is difficult to conceptualise how a society with high levels of altruism could possibly have low levels of social solidarity and social cohesion. The act of altruism in its truest sense, of giving to strangers with no consideration of reciprocity, was identified in Titmuss’ (1971) classic study of blood doning, as an indicator of ‘the good society’.

**Social exclusion**

**Process and outcome**

One of the major strands in thinking about social exclusion is primarily concerned with processes. For example, Barry (1998) identifies as central to social exclusion the processes by which individuals and their communities become polarised, socially differentiated and unequal. Similarly, for Berghman (1995) social exclusion is a breakdown or malfunctioning of the major social systems that should guarantee full citizenship, including: the democratic and legal system which provides civic integration; the labour market which provides economic integration; the welfare system, providing social integration; and the family and community system, providing interpersonal integration.

A general theme of these approaches to social exclusion is to do with social exclusionary processes that lead to isolation, exclusion and detachment from society and its institutions. This is not to say that social exclusion is concerned only with processes, it also includes outcomes – and often process and outcome are inextricably intertwined in discussions of the nature of social

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2 The material here is developed from Phillips, 2006, chapter 4.
exclusion. Process and outcome can also be treated separately. For example, Berghman (1995) and Berger-Schmitt (2000), argue that social exclusion can be regarded both as a property of societies (largely process-oriented) and as an attribute of individuals, groups and communities (largely outcome-oriented). In the latter context, social exclusion can be defined as a low level of welfare and an inability to participate in social life.

The notions of participation and of access to resources necessary for participation are central to many definitions (Klasen, 2001). Steinert (2003:5), perhaps expresses this most tellingly in terms of: ‘exclusion from full participation in the social, including material as well as symbolic, resources produced, supplied and exploited in a society for making a living, organising a life and taking part in the development of a (hopefully better) future’. Empirical studies of the overview-oriented aspects of social exclusion address issues which can loosely be classified as ‘multiple deprivation’. Here the outcomes are classified into different dimensions. Burchardt et al. (1999) identify five ‘activities’: consumption; savings; production; political; and social. McCrystal et al. (2001) identify: unemployment; deficiencies in local government services, community resources, housing and public transport; and levels of crime, ill health, debt and poor educational achievement. These exclusionary outcomes are each cumulative over time and they also interact with each other cumulatively. Thus, in this formulation, social exclusion is seen as resulting from the interaction of different exclusionary spheres, leading to multiple deprivation.

Bringing together the process-oriented and outcome-oriented aspects of social exclusion enables conceptual developments to be undertaken, relating processes and systems of social exclusion to societal normative value systems and social structures, particularly in relation to social cohesion. This provides an opportunity to explore the societal preconditions for, constraints upon and parameters of both individual and societal quality of life.

In Steinert’s participation-oriented formulation, social exclusion may be continuous, relatively indivisible and gradual, ranging from a status of being fully included through to that of being completely excluded. According to Steinert (2003:4) ‘the “normal” model of being excluded is the dynamic, contested, episodic threat of exclusion that the person can fight against and often compensate’. He identifies political, economic, social and cultural exclusion as arising, respectively, from deficiencies in citizenship, lack of resources, isolation and deficits in education. He claims that these dimensions are often independent and it can be possible to counteract them through mobilising resources in other dimensions.

Wessels and Miedema (2002:73) produce a more formal typology of social exclusion moving on a continuum from mild to severe, thus:

(i) Alternative exclusion: actors seek alternative lifestyles outside mainstream society. Here to some extent the exclusion is voluntary, although it can be precipitated by negative experiences in everyday life. A good example of this might be where people subject to employment discrimination because of their ethnicity or religion, set up their own businesses and live in tight-knit
communities, not interacting socially with ‘outsiders. The Jewish community in the East End of London at the beginning of the twentieth century is a good example of this alternative exclusion (Phillips, 2002).

(ii) Preliminary exclusion: actors face minor disruption but are still able to participate in social, political and cultural life. This is the beginning of ‘real’ social exclusion and it could be relatively trivial (for example there are still some restriction upon Catholics in the UK, such as not being able to marry the heir to the British throne). Alternatively, it might be part of a dynamic of exclusion, the first stage of a slippery slope where initial discrimination is a precursor to more draconian exclusion.

(iii) Intermediate exclusion: actors are excluded from some specific institutional forms and arrangements but they are generally still involved in mainstream institutional frameworks. Exclusion on the basis of gender is an interesting example here. The issue of women bishops in Church of England are highly specific examples of intermediate exclusion.

(iv) Advanced exclusion: actors are outside many mainstream and institutional forms of inclusion, via a combination of social and economic factors and are faced with considerable barriers to becoming included. This is the central type of exclusion in Wessels and Miedema’s formulation in that it permeates many different dimensions of social life and is cumulative and multidimensional. Taken together, Wessels and Miedema’s intermediate and advanced exclusion appear to be similar in scope and nature to Steinert’s notion of ‘normal’ exclusion.

(v) Severe exclusion: actors exist largely in their own world: they are mostly isolated from common social formal and informal institutions and forms of inclusion. Steinert (2003:4) identifies such ‘overall exclusion’ as an extreme and limiting case.

The ‘severe’ category identified by Wessels and Miedema is in effect a special case in that it approximates to notions of social exclusion as permanent and decisive detachment from society rather than on a continuum of disengagement or segregation. Room (1999) uses this formulation as a final stage in differentiating between poverty and social exclusion where poverty is seen as a continuum of inequality whereas social exclusion is seen as ‘catastrophic rupture’ where participation in wider society is curtailed:

In short, then, to use the notion of social exclusion carries the implication that we are speaking of people who are suffering such a degree of multi-dimensional disadvantage of such duration, and reinforced by such material and cultural degradation of the neighbourhoods in which they live, that their relational links with the wider society are ruptured to a degree which is in some considerable degree irreversible.

(Room, 1999:171)

Wessels and Miedema’s notion of severe exclusion, Steinert’s overall exclusion and Room’s catastrophic rupture can be seen as absolute forms of social exclusion in that it is both a complete and irreversible detachment from society and the social order. This form of social exclusion is perhaps most commonly exemplified in the USA and Europe by the situation of asylum
seekers and those classified as illegal immigrants: these will be discussed later.

Causes of social exclusion

There are at least two different sets of causes of social exclusion, those relating to processes and to outcomes. Wessels and Miedema (2002) identify the notion of belonging as being central to processes and access to relevant resource structures as central to outcomes. Interestingly, they identify a third set of causes around the notion of trust which links social exclusion to the social cohesion construct. Implicit in this approach is the proposition that social exclusion itself has a third normative dimension as well as that of process and outcome. According to Wessels and Miedema (2002:62), if there is a substantive deficiency in either belonging, trust or access to relevant resource structures then social exclusion will result.

Wessels and Miedema (2002) also identify three levels of analysis for each of these dimensions, starting at the individual or biographical level, then moving to the neighbourhood, group or network, which they label the ‘social’ or ‘life world’ and finally the societal or structural level. The identification of different levels, and of the interactions between them, provides a major step forward in operationalising the notion of social exclusion. Wessels and Miedema (2002:65) give examples at all three levels covering all three dimensions of factors causing social exclusion, as follows:

Societal or structural level. Here lack of belonging is manifested in terms of social fragmentation, anomie, antagonism and retreatism. Similarly there is lack of trust in institutions and authorities. A lack of access to resources is manifested in problems of subsistence and an increasing dichotomy between the haves and have-nots. At a structural level therefore, Wessels and Miedema see fragmented, alienated, mistrustful groups and communities not having a full national identity or sense of citizenship, themselves being mistrusted by the rest of society and perhaps seen as engaging in free-rider activities, using illegal opportunity structures and being antagonistic to mainstream society. Stereotypes that immediately come to mind here, include, asylum seekers, illegal immigrants, and other minority groups.

Lifeworld level – neighbourhood, group, network. Lack of belonging is evidenced by local segregation and disengagement. Lack of co-operation, negative attitudes and stigmatisation all arise from lack of trust. Low quality local infrastructures and public facilities, including health services, schools and housing are all examples of a lack of lifeworld resource availability. Socially excluded communities, according to this formulation, are places suffering from a poor physical and social environment with low opportunities for social advancement, whose residents are profoundly stigmatised and shunned by other communities, The classic stereotype of the socially excluded community here is the ghetto or the locality ‘on the wrong side of the tracks’.
Biographical, individual level. Here loneliness, isolation, low self esteem are signs of lack of belonging; there is mistrust of figures in authority and fear of others in general; and resource deprivation is manifested through unemployment and lack of life chances. Thus, socially excluded individuals are seen as having low self-esteem, as being brought up in disrupted, ‘problem’ families, being disengaged from social, political and (legal) economic activity and not having the opportunity to engage in a ‘normal’ social life. Homeless people, ‘drug addicts’, ‘problem families’ all represent stereotypes of the individual manifestation of social exclusion.

The different levels of analysis allow for the integration of different explanatory levels into identifying causes and tracking the extent of social exclusion. For example, the structural and life-world sets of explanations dealing with social segregation and stigmatisation, can be exemplified at the biographical level directly in relation to primary social exclusion from resource accessibility. Some of the reasons, for example, why many British Muslims of South Asian descent are unemployed, are disengaged from mainstream politics and mistrustful of the police and of other authority figures can be traced to the exclusionary factors at work, relating to belonging, resources and trust, both in their localities, where they live in social excluded communities, and nationally where they suffer from stigmatisation and normative discrimination (particularly with increased Islamophobia since ‘nine-eleven’). Thus for Wessels and Miedema, the causes of the three levels of social exclusion interact and are cumulative: for an individual social exclusion is a personal tragedy; for a local geographical community, it is a major social problem; for a whole national community or ethnos grouping it is a sign of a deeply fractured society.

Social exclusion and social inclusion

So far only social exclusion has been addressed, not social inclusion. This would be entirely straightforward if there were consensus in the literature that inclusion and exclusion were two ends of a continuum or, more starkly, the two sides of a binary attribute. Indeed, much of the literature tacitly assumes this, However, not all commentators are agreed. Steinert (2003:6), for example, distinguishes between integration and participation as potential opposites to exclusion. He rejects integration (presumably synonymous with ‘inclusion’) as being too passive and potentially stultifying, requiring conformity to social norms and demands. This has resonances with Barry’s (1998) comment that highly socially integrated societies can be marked by large inequalities of power and status: indeed Barry concludes that income differentials need to be restricted in order to counter social exclusion, with an acceptable range being between 50 per cent and 300 per cent of median income. Steinert characterises participation as active engagement, which is similar to Doyal and Gough’s (1991) notion of critical participation in the context of their theory of human need. Klasen (2001), while not directly contrasting social exclusion with any other construct, takes a rights-based approach to counteracting social exclusion which has a strong affinity with
Sen’s (1993) capability approach and, like Barry, his perspective requires provision of rights for the most disadvantaged in society.

Walker and Wigfield insist that social inclusion is not simply the opposite of social exclusion. They compare inclusion and exclusion as follows:

If social exclusion is the denial (or non-realisation) of different dimensions of citizenship then the other side of the coin, social inclusion, is the degree to which such citizenship is realised. Formally we might define social inclusion as the degree to which people are and feel integrated in the different relationships, organisations, sub-systems and structures that constitute everyday life.

(Walker and Wigfield, 2003:9)

There are important insights here: in this context social inclusion is not simply the opposite of exclusion; it is more than that. It provides, in effect a starting point for positive citizenship. From this perspective there can be seen to be a continuum between exclusion and inclusion where high quality of inclusion requires a high level of critical participation and fulfilment of capabilities not merely integration within an inegalitarian and rigidly hierarchical society..

Unfortunately, the situation is rather more complex than this in the real world. Some very unequal and highly socially differentiated countries, such as the USA, have high levels of geographical segregation with at one extreme, ‘ghetto’ communities of socially excluded, poor and disempowered groups and at the other extreme, a mirror-image of ‘gated’ communities of the very rich who choose to segregate and insulate themselves from the mass of society within communities reminiscent of medieval walled cities, patrolled by guards and with high-tech surveillance systems. In contexts such as this, social exclusion and inclusion appear to be neither a binary divide nor a continuum but a ‘double exclusion’ including involuntarily ultra-excluded at one end and voluntary ultra-exclusionary at the other extreme, with different degrees of spatial and social segregation in-between.

Therefore, social exclusion also has at least three potential interactions with its antithesis of social inclusion. The first is a relatively smooth continuum of inclusion-exclusion, similar to the gradations of income in the relative definition of poverty where exclusion is by degrees rather than by decisive detachment. This appears to be the situation in Britain – at least for its full citizens – according to the findings of Burchardt et al. (1999). The second is more dramatic, is of binary divide between a small completely detached minority and a large, included and highly socially integrated majority as is the situation with asylum seekers or illegal immigrants in a tight knit society: Denmark might be an appropriate example here. The third, a discontinuous double exclusion relates to highly segregated and differentiated societies such as the USA (Barry, 1998).

Social cohesion social inclusion and social exclusion
The time has now come to explore the relationship between social cohesion and social exclusion in more depth. This is a largely unexplored area. Blokland (2000:56), though arguing that ‘cohesion is gradually fused with social exclusion’, complains that present theoretical frameworks are inadequate for studying either construct. Indeed, only three overarching models of quality of life which incorporate both constructs have been found in the academic literature.

In Bernard’s (1999) Democratic Dialectic social exclusion is conceptualised within the framework of social cohesion and is seen as a failure in cohesion. Berger-Schmitt and Noll’s (2000) overarching Quality of Life model perhaps has the clearest exposition of the relationship: here social cohesion has two parts, one is a social capital dimension and the other is an inequalities dimension, an integral part of which is the outcome-oriented manifestation of social exclusion. So for Berger-Schmitt and Noll, social exclusion and social capital are two, conceptually separate, elements of social cohesion. In the third model, Social Quality, (Beck et al., 1997, Beck et al., 2001) the relationship between the two constructs is different; instead of social exclusion being incorporated within social cohesion, the two are conceptualised as being distinct dimensions with neither having priority or dominion over the other. This is probably the most fruitful approach and it is will be revisited later in this paper.

Given that all the commentators cited in this paper present social cohesion as a good and positive thing and social exclusion as a bad or negative thing then in principle, and other things being equal, the nature of their interrelationship and interaction should be straightforward. If the two constructs are causally related in any way then it is clear that this should be an inverse relationship: an increase in social cohesion ought to lead to a decrease in social exclusion, or at least that high levels of social exclusion imply low levels of social cohesion.

But, in contradiction to this, it is also arguable that high levels of social cohesion imply high levels of social exclusion too. This is the argument forcefully made in a somewhat different context by Jordan who claims that exclusion – or excluding – is a defining characteristic of all groups: ‘In emphasising the demands of active citizenship, theorists are (usually unintentionally) strengthening the case for various kinds of exclusion. Conversely, those who focus on principles of inclusion weaken the case for grounding rights and duties in membership’ (Jordan, 1996:262). Jordan makes his case in the context of social exclusion and citizenship, not social cohesion, but the argument still holds. Strong ideological social cohesion can be substituted here for strong citizenship: the greater the amount of social justice and resource redistribution the more important become issues of entry, exit, inclusion and exclusion. Peled (1992) and Shafir and Peled (1998) make a similar point about strong versus weak communities: strong communities (including those with high ideological levels of social cohesion) have high levels of social inclusion, are harder to join and have higher costs of exclusion than weak communities where criteria for inclusion are less rigorous and therefore fewer members run the risk of exclusion.
A paradox appears to be emerging here in the potential simultaneous correlation between social cohesion and both social inclusion and social exclusion. Alternatively, a third, hitherto hidden, factor might have come into play: the bifurcation of social inclusion and social exclusion into two strands, that of quality and quantity. Perhaps the implication of Jordan’s and Shafir and Peled’s insights is that high quality social cohesion and high quality social inclusion may be entirely compatible with – or even causally related to – high quantity social exclusion, i.e. high levels of inclusion among the included and large numbers of socially excluded people (extreme examples of this would be highly cohesive societies with apartheid or slavery or even genocide).

This issue is particularly pertinent to tight-knit, homogeneous societies: the stronger the bonds of membership, the harder it is to meet these requirements and the larger the number of people potentially excluded. This also has implications for the different conceptions of social cohesion; is the ideological, egalitarian version better because it implies a lack of hierarchy and disparities of wealth and other resources within the ‘in-group’ or is it worse because egalitarianism is hard to achieve and therefore raises the stakes, making membership more exclusive and thus potentially condemning a larger number of people to be excluded?

It does seem that a loosely socially structured, heterogeneous or pluralistic society will have lower levels, or a lower threshold, of exclusion than a tightly socially structured, homogeneous mono-cultural society. The crucial issue is whether it will necessarily have lower or worse social cohesion. This raises the difficult question of whether social cohesion is a condition to be maximised or optimised: in other words, is more social cohesion always better social cohesion or can a society have too much of this good thing? Indeed, is there a necessary trade-off between cohesion and exclusion where a balance between the two maximises quality-of-life, quality-of-society or social quality? If not, and if it is possible to maximise both inclusion and cohesion then what attributes would a totally inclusive and cohesive society have: what would such a society look like? And would there be any barriers to entry into this utopia?

Put more formally, the above questions could be expressed as follows: with regards to any formulation of social exclusion and social cohesion (i) are they independent of each other? (ii) are they causally related but distinct constructs – and if so then what is the nature of the relationship between them? (iii) is one of them contained wholly within the meaning of the other or are they two inter-related aspects of a wider analytical construct?

First, though, definitions of the different approaches to social cohesion and social exclusion need to be presented. This is more straightforward with regard to social cohesion than social exclusion where there is less consensus, but it is still not unproblematic for either construct. The social cohesion definitions given here are largely generic whereas the social exclusion definitions are either derived from individual sources or are an amalgam of commonly used definitions. This is not intended to imply that the definitions
given are intended to be seen as final, rather they are intended to be representative of contemporary discussion of these topics. The definitions are as follows:

Social Cohesion
- **Non-ideological social cohesion**: interlocking networks; high levels of trust; other-regarding behaviour; i.e. civic institutions embedded in social structure.
- **Ideological social cohesion**: this is on a sliding scale, starting with non-ideological social cohesion plus, cumulatively: mitigating inequalities of opportunity; providing increasing degrees of equality of opportunity; reduction of disparities in income and wealth; and minimising inequality, poverty and social exclusion. NB in the strongest ideological definitions it is part of the meaning of social cohesion that social exclusion should be minimised (although whether this is the level of social exclusion among members of society or the number of people actually excluded from society is not specified).

Social Exclusion
- **Outcome-based social exclusion**: people are socially excluded if they are excluded from full participation in normal activities of their society (an amalgam of Steinert and Pilgrim (2003) and Burchardt et al. (1999)). Outcome-based social exclusion can be a discontinuous or gradual exclusion from one or more individual dimensions, or alternatively and more rarely, a catastrophic rupture from participation in wider society.
- **Process-based social exclusion**: the failure of one or more of the: democratic and legal system; labour market; welfare state system; communication systems; family and community system (drawn mainly from Berghman (1995), augmented by insights gained from Room (1999)).
- **Causal-based social exclusion**: denial or unavailability of belonging; trust; and access to relevant resource structures required by social actors in order to possess positive self-concepts (Wessels and Miedema, 2002).

(i) Are social exclusion and social cohesion independent of each other?

For two of the definitions of social exclusion it is immediately apparent that they cannot be independent of social cohesion. Causally-oriented definitions of social exclusion are necessarily linked through trust, and implicitly through access to resources, to both ideological and non-ideological approaches to social cohesion. Similarly, process-based social exclusion, defined in terms of the failure of systems, is necessarily related to the systems central to both sets of social cohesion definitions. For example, interlocking networks and civic institutions are common to both sets of definitions.

On the other hand, there does not have to be a necessary link between the outcome-based definition of social exclusion and social cohesion. One of the strengths of the outcome-based definition in analytical terms is that it makes no inferences on the causes of an individual’s exclusion: in principle these might be either not related at all to issues of social cohesion or else heavily
dependent upon them. Such a definition of social exclusion can be operationalised so as to be used to empirically test the relative importance of various aspects of social cohesion, or other factors in the different dimensions of the exclusion of different groups in society.

(ii) Are social exclusion and social cohesion causally related but distinct constructs – and if so then what is the nature of the relationship between them?

It is clear from the discussion above that outcome-oriented definitions of social exclusion are not necessarily causally related at all so here the emphasis will be on the other two approaches to social exclusion. The key to their relationship lies in the issue of the quality versus quantity of inclusion and exclusion discussed above. This topic is perhaps best approached using the distinction between the two constructs adopted by Walker and Wigfield (2003) who suggest that social cohesion concerns the structure of social relations whereas social inclusion focuses on the access to and level of integration in those relations.

Taking non-ideological social cohesion first; here a highly cohesive society would be well-organised, fair, socially integrated and with high levels of trust, but it would not necessarily be an egalitarian society. Indeed it is – at least according to conservative commentators – entirely compatible with a minimal-state, free market society with high levels of economic inequality (Fukuyama, 1995, 1999, 2001). Under such circumstances, as in a free economic market, the costs to society of ensuring that all residents are socially included are low. So unless there are distortions in the fabric of social cohesion (for example high levels of institutional and relational racism) it is unlikely that there will be large numbers of people totally excluded from such a society. So here the key feature would be the extent to which the relational and institutional systems are well-structured and provide equitable access. Both the process-based and causal-based approaches are, in principle, relevant here. In practice, an approach based on the causes of social exclusion is probably the easiest to use because a helpful starting point for just such an investigation is provided by Wessels and Miedema’s matrix, presented in chapter five. Interestingly, the extent to which individuals in such a society are socially excluded could be measured by an outcome-based instrument too. Relating this to the theme of welfare, it is clear that a society with minimal state welfare provision will thrive best in this context.

There is a lot more at stake in relation to ideological than non-ideological approaches to social cohesion, and this has considerable consequences for its interaction with social exclusion. Ideological social cohesion of the kind espoused by Bernard, Berger-Schmitt and Noll, and the social quality promulgators, requires major state intervention in the pursuit of social justice and tackling inequalities of income, wealth and life chances. This is an important policy issue in Canada, for example, with both an egalitarian conception of cohesion and dramatic inequalities between Anglophones and Francophones on the one hand and the indigenous population on the other.
Any society which is striving towards strong social justice and minimising material and non-material inequalities will also strive towards maximising access to and integration in cohesive social relations and institutions. In other words high levels of social cohesion entail high levels of social inclusion. As noted above, though, there is a membership-inclusion issue here. This can perhaps best be explored in relation to the position of immigrant members of a society. Returning to Peled’s (1992) point about strong communities having tough entry requirements, there is a danger of refugees, asylum seekers and economic migrants suffering from the extreme form of outcome-oriented social exclusion – catastrophic rupture – in societies with high levels of ideological social cohesion (Uslaner and Conley, 2003). This is also a problem in relation, for example to elderly dependants of recently naturalised immigrant citizens who may be barred from entry to such societies. As with non-ideological approaches to social cohesion, there is much to be gained by using a causally-based approach to social exclusion in analysing the interactions between structure of and access to the relations and systems that are central to ideological social cohesion.

So, a strong welfare state orientation will tend to lead to high barriers to entry – and is therefore exclusionary. A further tension emerges in relation to societies with strongly ideological approaches to social cohesion: this relates to issues of diversity, homogeneity and heterogeneity. This is a profoundly problematic issue in culturally diverse societies and is returned to briefly in chapter seven.

(iii) Is one of them contained wholly within the meaning of the other or are they two inter-related aspects of a wider analytical construct?

There is no agreement in the literature on this topic. For Bernard, social exclusion is contained wholly in the meaning of social cohesion. For Berger-Schmitt the extent of social exclusion in society is central to commonly accepted definitions of social cohesion and indeed, social exclusion is an essential part of one of the two dimensions of social cohesion. In spite of this, and as noted above, Berger-Schmitt clearly states that social exclusion and social capital ‘must be viewed as independent of each other to a degree’ (Berger-Schmitt, 2002:406). This is entirely consistent with her use of an outcome-based approach to defining social exclusion in this context. In relation to social quality, as will be seen later, social exclusion and social cohesion were presented as discreet entities. Contemporary theorising on social quality presents all four components in the context of the manifestation of ‘the social’ through the dialectical interaction between individual self realisation and the creating of collective identities, so in this context social exclusion and social cohesion can be identified as inter-related aspects of the wider analytical social quality construct.
The central theme here in relation to migration is that it results in substantial and rapidly growing informal systems of international support at individual and family level, primarily relating to remittances made by migrants to families in their country of origin. Berman and Phillips (forthcoming) note that the consequences of these informal systems are by no means negligible, with remittances being the second highest source of external funding for developing countries. They report that in 2000, 175 million people (5 per cent of the global population) were first generation migrants and that the majority of migrants maintain a strong long-term link with their country of origin which is most clearly manifested in sending money home in the form of remittances. These remittances are extremely important for the GNP and the social and economic development of many developing countries, being their second highest source of external funding and, in a few cases even accounting for more than 20 per cent of GNP (de Haas and Plug, 2006). Indeed, the amount in global remittances more than doubled between 2002 and 2007, providing evidence of the emergence of a broad transnational economic diaspora (see Table 1).

Table 1: Remittance flows to developing countries selected years ($ billions)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>2002</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>Increase 2002-07</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>South Asia</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>81%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle East and North Africa</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>86%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Asia and the Pacific</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>97%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America and the Caribbean</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>115%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-Saharan Africa</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>116%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe and Central Asia</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>175%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Developing countries total</strong></td>
<td><strong>116</strong></td>
<td><strong>161</strong></td>
<td><strong>221</strong></td>
<td><strong>240</strong></td>
<td><strong>107%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(from Berman and Phillips, forthcoming)

It can be seen from Table 1 that remittance flows in East Asia nearly doubled in the five years between 2002 and 2007, growing faster than in South Asia and the Middle East and North Africa, and were the highest or second highest in any region in all the individual years surveyed.

However, the provision of financial support to family and communities in the home country is only one facet of the impact of migration on welfare. Diasporic changes in national identity and the development of complex transnational identities are another important facet of migration, and have particular relevance for welfare and well-being.

Social Quality\(^3\)

A major challenge in bringing together the themes of migration, inclusion, exclusion, cohesion and identity in relation to welfare is to find an overarching

\(^3\) This section draws upon Phillips (2006:175-89) and Berman and Phillips (forthcoming)
framework which can accommodate these various strands. Many of the welfare and quality of life measures in present use are ad hoc lists of disparate unconnected elements (Hagerty et al., 2001; Fahey et al., 2002) or are rather narrowly based on needs without taking account of other elements of the 'good life' (Stewart 1996) whereas others are more conceptually robust, based on, for example, capabilities or prudential values (Sen 1993; Griffin 1986) but which do not have definitive measures, relying instead on a process of deliberation to arrive at consensual measures in specific settings (Phillips 2008b).

Welfare here is addressed in the context of the emergent theory of social quality, a multidisciplinary theoretical construct on the quality of societies and individuals which has been operationalised into an integrated system of domains and indicators and has been tested out in thirteen European countries and is at present being implemented in five Asian countries (Gasper et al. 2009).

Social quality was developed by European scholars in the mid 1990s as an antidote and counterbalance to the predominance of economic measures of quality of life (particularly GDP) over social measures. Its influence in both academic and policy circles has grown rapidly. The declaration at its launch in 1997 was signed by 74 academics from the fields of social policy, sociology, political science, law and economics. Within two years it had been signed by 800 European social science academics, and the European Union has since actively embraced the concept and has incorporated it into its social reporting: in 2001 the primary EU annual social statistical report, The Social Situation of the European Union, was themed around social quality. In addition the European Commission’s Directorate General for Employment and Social Affairs chose social quality as one of its three priority area for action in 2000. Three books have been devoted to the exposition and theoretical development of social quality (Beck et al., 1997, 2001, forthcoming) and an international journal devoted to the topic was inaugurated in 1999 as The European Journal of Social Quality and has now been rebadged as The International Journal of Social Quality because of its recent international academic and policy implementation, particularly in Asia. Social quality is now probably the most thoroughly theorised and operationalised holistic societal quality of life constructs (Phillips 2006:176).

The architecture of social quality

Social quality is defined as 'the extent to which people are able to participate in social relationships under conditions which enhance their well-being, capacity and individual potential' (Beck et al. 2007:25). Social quality focuses on both the social and the individual level. The social quality of a collectivity is not just the accumulation of the life quality of each of its individual members: it incorporates collective as well as individual attributes and is holistic in its orientation. Its epitome is a society that is not only economically successful but also promotes social participation and social justice. A society with high social quality is envisaged by its promulgators as one where:
Citizens would be able and required to participate in the social and economic life of their communities and to do so under conditions which enhance their well-being, their individual potential and the welfare of their communities. To be able to participate, citizens must have access to an acceptable level of economic security and of social inclusion, live in cohesive communities, and be empowered to develop their full potential. In other words, social quality depends on the extent to which economic, social and political citizenship is enjoyed by all residents. (Walker, 1998:109).

Social quality is intended to be comprehensive and to encompass both objective and subjective interpretations. Beck et al. (1997) identified four conditional factors of social quality:

**Socio-economic security** is the extent to which people have sufficient resources over time. It concerns the outcomes of the provision of protection by collective entities (communities as well as systems and institutions) as conditions for processes of self-realisation. Socio-economic security has two aspects: (i) all welfare provisions which guarantee the primary existential security of citizens (income, social protection, health), basic security of daily life (food safety, environmental issues, safety at work) and internal freedom, security and justice; and (ii) enhancing people's life chances: 'Its mission is to enlarge the realm of options between which people can choose' (Beck et al., 2001:341).

**Social inclusion** is the extent to which people have access to institutions and social relations. It refers to participation and to processes of being included in collective identities and the realities that determine self-realisation. Social inclusion is connected with the principles of equality and equity and their structural causes. Its subject matter is citizenship, which 'refers to the possibility of participation in economic, political, social and cultural systems and institutions' (Beck et al., 2001:346).

**Social cohesion** is the nature of social relations based on shared identities, values and norms. Social cohesion refers to solidarity as the basis for collective identities and concerns the processes that create, defend or demolish social networks and the social infrastructures underpinning these networks. An adequate level of social cohesion is one which enables citizens 'to exist as real human subjects, as social beings' (Beck et al., 1997:284).

**Social empowerment** is the extent to which the personal capabilities of individual people and their ability to act are enhanced by social relations. Social empowerment is the realisation of human competencies and capabilities, in order to fully participate in social, economic, political and cultural processes. It refers to being enabled to engage in collective identities as essential preconditions for self-realisation and primarily concerns enabling people, as citizens, to develop their full potential.

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**The Social Quality Quadrant**
These conditional factors have been operationalised via a series of domains and sub-domains into 95 indicators which have been trialed in 13 EU countries (Gordon, 2004). Full reports are available in a double issue of the European Journal of Social Quality (2004:5/1-2). At present the indicator set is being reviewed for an East Asian context and the revised set is being piloted during 2009 in Taiwan, Hong Kong, Thailand and Japan (Phillips 2008a). Tentative negotiations are also taking place to initiate surveys of social quality in South Asia and in Central Asia.

Social quality theory draws upon the critical realism of Bhaskar and is based on four assumptions:

(i) people are essentially social beings

(ii) there is constitutive interdependency: a dialectic between the self-realisation of individuals as social beings and processes leading to the formation of collective identities. This dialectic is the realisation of ‘the social’

(iii) there are two sets of tensions: (a) between societal development and biographical development (originally characterised as being between the macro and the micro); and (b) between the formal world of systems, institutions and organisations and the informal life-worlds of families, groups and communities

(iv) social change occurs in relation to the interactions between the second and third assumptions (Beck et al. 2007:17)
Social quality and migration: community social quality within nations and international community social quality

In previous work Yitzhak Berman and I introduced the notion of community social quality in the context of what Delanty (1998) calls ethnos communities: including immigrant communities (Phillips and Berman, 2003). Our main focus was on the relationships between the ethnos communities and national agencies and institutions in their destination country. We posited that there are three facets to the social quality of community members in the destination country: individually as citizens in relation to their dealings with the nation and society in which they live; individually as community members (derived from the support provided by community institutions and from the strength of community identity); and collectively via the social quality of the community itself depending on its strength as a collective entity in its own right and on its relationship to the nation state. (These are discussed respectively in Berman and Phillips 2000; and Phillips and Berman 2001 and 2003).

Briefly, Phillips and Berman (2003) conclude that the third of these themes, the social quality of the ethnos community itself has two dimensions: internal and external to the community. Internal community social quality — the social quality of community members within the community in the destination country — depends crucially upon internal community inclusion, via strong networks, and community cohesion, where a strong sense of identity along with trust and other integrative norms and values, are essential. High levels of community socio-economic security are beneficial, but not essential, to internal community social quality. External community social quality — the social quality of the community within the destination society — is primarily dependent on the nature on societal social cohesion: a society which has homogeneous social cohesion will exclude minority groups unless they assimilate whereas one with pluralistic social cohesion provides opportunities for enhanced community empowerment. Here the relationships between societal social exclusion and social inclusion, discussed above, is vital.

None of these previous publications, however, discussed the interactions between members of the migrant ethnos community and their families and communities in their country of origin. That analysis is further developed in our most recent paper (Berman and Phillips, forthcoming) in an international framework to include interactions and relationships between communities in the destination countries and their countries of origin. In principle international community social quality can include three geographical facets, two of which are specific locations: in the destination country; in the country of origin; and between the two as a transnational community, or perhaps more precisely as a community whose members have a transnational identity (Ong 1999). Often, the destination country is the most important on a day-to-day basis: this is where the migrant community lives. The country of origin is often a major long term focus of attention, particularly for those who are temporary migrants but also for many who stay in the destination country, many of whom feel

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4 This section draws upon Berman and Phillips (forthcoming)
intensely socially included in their community and society of origin even if they never resettle there.

The more cosmopolitan, post-industrial transnational identity incorporates aspects of the previous two facets and is increasingly important, particularly among members of second generation migrant families who are born and brought up in one country as members of a minority community but who have their roots and relatives in their country of origin which they often visit and where some feel equally at home (Bains, 2005).

Berman and Phillips (forthcoming) explore the potential consequences for the four social quality conditional factors – socio-economic security, social inclusion, social cohesion and social empowerment. Their overview is summarised in Table 2 which gives an indication of examples of the potential consequences of migration upon the four conditional factors of social quality in each of the three types of community.

**Table 2: Social quality and ethnos communities**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Consequences for</th>
<th>Community in</th>
<th>Community of</th>
<th>Transnational</th>
<th>community</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>destination</td>
<td>origin</td>
<td></td>
<td>community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Socio-economic security</strong></td>
<td>Initial stages of migration supported by family at home</td>
<td>Receipt of remittances once migrants are settled</td>
<td>Potential for long term mutual support</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Social inclusion</strong></td>
<td>Risk of isolation, discrimination and exclusion from mainstream destination society</td>
<td>Potentially problematic in terms of loss of face-to-face network but ‘virtual inclusion’ might be possible through mobile phone, internet and Skype technology</td>
<td>Goal of strong inclusion in both communities, facilitated by regular physical and electronic communication; danger of dilution of inclusion or of exclusion for one or both</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Social cohesion</strong></td>
<td>Strong bonding and reciprocal norms essential for community survival. High levels of trust required for community of origin to make investment</td>
<td>Danger from increased inequality between families receiving and not receiving remittances – the latter being incrementally disadvantaged if none of their</td>
<td>Potential for development of strong non-spatial community identity, particularly via electronic communications</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Berman and Phillips conclude the following. First, in relation to socio-economic security in the country of origin there are in general macro levels gains in both income sufficiency and income security: they cite Lucas’s (2006) study identifying wide indirect multiplier effects of remittances providing economic stimulation. At micro level, there is often an initial period of increased hardship before remittances start flowing regularly and when the migrants’ lost contribution to family resources are keenly felt, but this is normally followed by substantial increases in both income security and income sufficiency in among families in the country of origin. Secondly, they identify more indirect and interactive factors among the other three social quality conditional factors.

Social empowerment – enabling people to develop their full potential – is the most straightforward, particularly in relation to the community of origin. Centrally important is its domain of personal relationships and sub domains of: supporting physical and social independence, personal support services and support for social interaction. Berman and Phillips (forthcoming, manuscript p 14) claim that remittances are centrally important for these and state ‘it is clear that spending remittances on children’s health, education and welfare expand capabilities and develop human potential’.

Whereas the impact of remittances on empowerment is more important for the community of origin, their impact on social cohesion and social inclusion are more relevant to the transnational community. Given that most communities in the destination country have strong links with a specific community or communities in the country of origin (Roberts, 1994), the resulting transnational community forms what Rouse (1992:45) calls ‘a transnational migrant circuit’ which enhances the domains of social cohesion relating to trust and other integrative norms and values through visits, remittances, family gifts, and donations to community projects. Similarly, from a social inclusion perspective, migrants might want to retain ties to their rural households so they can return if they encounter insuperable problems in sustaining themselves in the destination country. Therefore it is important for them to continue to participate in networks which reinforce their transnational community membership and inclusion. Berman and Phillips conclude that
'Investment in community support explicitly demonstrate the loyalty and continuing community identity of overseas members as well as providing a public display of the financial success of the migrants, thus increasing the status of their families in the community of origin' (Berman and Phillips, forthcoming, manuscript p 15).

**Bringing it all together**

There is a strong interaction between migration, identity, social inclusion, social exclusion and social cohesion. This interaction takes place in three arenas; two are in geographical locations – the country of origin and the destination country – and the third is trans-geographical in nature. The welfare of migrants is optimised when they have a strong identity and strong social quality in all three arenas.

Migration has important consequences for both the destination country and the country of origin. If the destination country espouses strong ideological social cohesion and has a tradition of universalistic, as-of-right state welfare then large scale migration will impose severe strain on the system which will probably be manifested in either the scaling back of benefits or services in general, or in differential entitlements to indigenous and migrant claimants, or even in migrants being systematically excluded both from welfare benefits and citizenship rights.

On the other hand, a country with non-ideological social cohesion and weaker, low level criteria for inclusion and citizenship, would not be providing high levels of state welfare anyway and therefore would be under far less pressure to discriminate against migrants: this, of course, fits well with the classic vision of the USA where the American Dream is predicated upon self-reliant immigrant ‘pioneers’.

The welfare consequences in the country of origin would normally be contingent upon the economic and employment circumstances of migrants in the destination country. So long as the migrants are in relatively regular employment and can send home remittances then, other things being equal, welfare in their country of origin will be enhanced. However, in an economic downturn in the destination country it is the migrants who will suffer first and if their remittances dry up then the country of origin will suffer a double blow in absence of both remittances and of the migrant themselves. In both of these cases the strength and resilience of the transnational community is central, particularly for second generation migrants and even more so for those who have not achieved full citizenship status in the country to which their parent or parents migrated.

**Acknowledgements**
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References


